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Education and well-being of school children
Joint objective of compulsory education:
• help students to build human capital / signal their ability through achievement
• teach students norms to foster well-being, e.g. lead a healthy and safe life
Sharp increase in interest in the role of education in shaping individuals’ well-being:
• ”No Child Left Behind” by the US Department of Education
• ”Every child matters” by the UK Department of Children, School and Family
No consensus on the channels through which education influences children’s well-
being
Contribution and findings
• interpret and identify the effect of achievement on the well-being of students
• estimate a negative effect of achievement on the probability that the police
stops the child using data on secondary school children in England
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Summary evidence on well-being of school children
Whether police have got in Whether ever vandalised public property Total
touch with the family No Yes
because of children actions
No .8645 .0659 .9304
Yes .0502 .0194 .0696
Total .9147 .0853 1
Source: Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England Wave 2, 12344 observations
Parents report that 7% of children behaved in such a way to prompt the police to
contact or visit; under-reporting is a potential source of bias
Children report that 9% vandalised public property; estimates vary by gender and
socio-economic background
Among the children whose parents get a police contact or visit:
• few report to have vandalised public property
• the remaining contacts by the police deal with such other self-reported problems
as shoplifting, smashing public property and fights
2
Achievement levels and test marks in the 2004 Key Stage 3 maths
tests, tier 3-5
(1) (2) (3)
Achievement Test Percentage
level mark range of students
2 23-28 2.97
3 29-63 36.31
4 64-98 47.79
5 99+ 12.95
Source: National Pupil Database, 12344 observations
36% of children score level 3 in the Key Stage 3 maths while DCSF expects them
to reach level 4 or greater at that stage of their education
Achievement and broader outcomes of education are of great concern in the UK
due to mixed evidence on the disengagement of school children
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Assignment of students across tiers in Key Stage 3 Maths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KS3 Maths Percentage Percentage of students Percentage of families
test tier of students below level 4 ∀ tier the police contacted
3-5 21.98 39.2 10.9
4-6 33.71 0.56 7.9
5-7 27.95 0 4.3
6-8 16.33 0 2.1
Source: Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England Wave 2 and National Pupil Database, 12344 observations
The paper focuses on students in Key Stage 3 Maths tier 3-5 among whom 39.2%
under-achieves
From tier 4-6 on
• there are no under-achievers
• police contacts decrease
Discretionary assignment by teachers of students to different tiers in Key Stage
tests motivates the focus on one tier; Miranda and Sartarelli (2009) deal with
inter-tiers variation
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Institutional framework: the British national school curriculum
Age Stage Year Assessment
3-4 Early Years
Foundation Stage
4-5 Reception
5-6 Key Stage 1 1
6-7 2 Teacher assessments in English, maths and science
7-8 Key Stage 2 3
8-9 4
9-10 5
10-11 6 National tests and teacher assessments in English, maths and science
11-12 Key Stage 3 7 Ongoing teacher assessments
12-13 8 Ongoing teacher assessments
13-14 9 National and teacher assessments English, maths and science and the other foundation subjects
14-15 Key Stage 4 10 Some children take GCSEs
15-16 11 Most children take GCSEs or other national qualifications
The UK school curriculum for children from 5 years of age to the compulsory school
leaving age at 16 is divided into four Key Stages (KS) from 1 to 4
Secondary school goes from Key Stage 3 to 4 with children aged 11 to 16
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Institutional framework: grading of test scripts
Teachers are not involved in grading their students’ test scripts
KS tests are marked anonymously by national curriculum tests markers using a
scale 0-100+
Students and parents get the
• test marks for KS2 only and others on demand
• teacher assessment levels that the child has achieved
• average achievement level
– for all the children in a child’s age group in the same school
– in the previous year in England
Grading systems and tables are hardly manipulable as they are periodically reviewed
jointly by:
• DCSF
• Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA)
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Partial literature review
Gibbons and Silva (2008), enjoyment at school and achievement
Benabou and Tirole (2003), motivation and achievement
Flink et al. (1990), students-teachers interaction and cognitive dissonance
Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008), sheltering - learning from experience tradeoff
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) risk and cognitive dissonance
Grossman (2005), education and non-market outcomes
Heckman et al (2006), (non-)cognitive abilities, labor market outcomes and social
behaviour
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Stylised model of achievement and well-being
Let parents and children jointly choose time to spend in supervised learning ts and
leisure tl to maximise
• a concave and C2 utility u function arising from two activities/goods:
– supervised learning s(ts, a) by schools/parents with varying intensity of in-
centives, competition and achievement captured by a
– leisure or free-of-supervision activity l(tl)
• subject to a time constraint ts + tl ≤ 1
max
ts,tl
u(ts, tl, a) = s(ts, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
supervised activity
+ l(tl)︸︷︷︸
leisure activity
s.t. ts + tl = 1
On average parents would like extra ts while children extra tl
8
Comparative statics of the model equilibrium
t∗l ∈ argmaxtl
u(tl, a) = s(1− tl, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
supervised activity
+ l(tl)︸︷︷︸
leisure activity
∂t∗l
∂a
Q 0
The change in the optimal allocation t∗l of leisure time by parents and children is
a proxy for a change in well-being, defined by a measure of outcome evaluated by
some other party as in Heckman (2008)
Benabou and Tirole (2003) reconcile the contrasting predictions on the effect of a
shock to the utility function in:
• economics where incentives matter ∂t
∗
l
∂a < 0, see Lazear (1990)
• psychology where incentives may undermine motivation and ∂t
∗
l
∂a > 0, see Flink
et al. (1990)
Whether
∂t∗l
∂a Q 0 is ultimately an empirical matter
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Research design
T ∗ = α + βA + U (1)
T =
{
1 if T ∗ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
A = f (Z) (2)
lim
Z↓Z¯
E[T |Z]− lim
Z↑Z¯
E[T |Z] = β + lim
Z↓Z¯
E[U |Z]− lim
Z↑Z¯
E[U |Z] (3)
= β if lim
Z↓Z¯
E[U |Z] = lim
Z↑Z¯
E[U |Z]
T ∗ is latent/unobservable leisure time. T equals 1 in the event of a police contact
triggered by a value T ∗ ≥ 0 above which well-being deteriorates and 0 otherwise
A is qualitative achievement, e.g. bad or good; unobservables may correlate with
A and T , e.g. parental guidance
Z is a continuous test score underlying A and Z¯ is an administrative cutoff in Z
β is the average effect ofA on T under the identifying assumption limZ↓Z¯ E[U |Z] =
limZ↑Z¯ E[U |Z] that errors are continuous at Z¯
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Illustration of the research design using an administrative
discontinuity
(1) (2) (3)
Achievement Test Percentage
level mark range of students
2 23-28 2.97
3 29-63 36.31
4 64-98 47.79
5 99+ 12.95
Source: UK Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
An administrative rule mapping test marks in column (2) to achievement levels in
column (1):
• is the assignment to treatment rule
• conforms to a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD)
Two students scoring 63 and 64 achieve respectively levels around the cutoff 3,
bad and 4, good, by chance, absent manipulation of the score or the level
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Illustration of the research design
2004 Key Stage 3 Maths 
total mark (0-100+)
2004 Key Stage 3 Maths 
level (4-7)
2004 LSYPE well-being 
questions: police visits, 
truancy, vandalising
TAZ
+/-?
Determines through threshold 
tables by the Department of 
Schools, Child and Family
+
Time
Key stage 3 
Maths test
April 2004 July 2004
Key stage 3 
Maths test
results
May-October 2004
LSYPE interview 
(child and parents)
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RDD estimation strategy in 3 steps
I carry out as in Imbens and Lemieux (2007):
1) graphical analysis by estimating local polynomials f (Z) of well-being separately
below/above the achievement cutoff Z¯
2) 2SLS-IV estimates of the effect of a good mark on well-being following the
characterisation of TSLS as RDD in Hahn et al. (2001)
3) robustness checks to rule out that estimates are potentially biased due to:
– unobservables that affect both pre-treatment variables and the outcome vari-
able
– sorting around the achievement cutoff Z¯
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Estimation step 1: graphical analysis
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An increase KS3 maths test mark from left to right of the levels 3-4 cutoff decreases
the probability of police contacts by 14 percentage points
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Estimation step 1: graphical analysis (cont.d)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance in KS3 Estimate Standard Observations
maths marks from Error
the cutoff
2 -.144 .113 112
3 -.140 .118 166
4 -.135 .112 223
5 -.134 .113 271
If one re-estimates the effect of the good grade on well-being by using a window
that is centered at the cutoff and that has a varying size as in column (1), estimates:
• do not change considerably
• are statistically significant at 10%
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Estimation step 2: comparison between RDD and OLS estimates
RDD OLS
Covariates Achievement Achievement quadratic
quadratic and covariates
Estimate -.044** -.036 .003 .013
Standard error .0176 .047 .031 .071
Estimates using the 2SLS specification in Hahn et al. (2001) say that a jump from
a bad grade on the left of the cutoff to a good one on the right decreases the
probability of a police contact by 4 percentage points
Under the weak and testable RDD assumptions OLS estimates:
• are upward biased
• yield a spurious zero correlation between achievement and well-being that is
likely driven by unobservables
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Estimation step 3: unobservables and pre-treatment variables
The research design fails if unobservables affect:
• pre-treatment covariates that are determined e.g. the year before the KS3 test
• the KS3 maths test mark around the cutoff at 64
No jumps in pre-treatment variables, e.g. parental guidance, rule out unobservable
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Estimation step 3: unobservables and pre-treatment variables (cont.d)
Small jumps in pre-treatment variables around the achievement cutoff support the
identifying assumption limZ↓Z¯ E[U |Z] = limZ↑Z¯ E[U |Z]
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Estimation step 3: sorting around the cutoff (cont.d)
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Performing the McCrary (2008) test of the continuity of KS3 maths test mark
distribution at the mark cutoff at 64:
• no suspicious masses in the empirical density suggest no sorting at the cutoff
• the null hypothesis of no sorting at the cutoff is not rejected at 5% significance
level
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Summary of preliminary findings
Evidence on bully, truant and disengaged school children has increased the con-
cern of policy makers on their well-being and on the role that education plays in
fostering it
I interpret the event of a police contact with parents due to the childrens’ behaviour
as excess unobservable leisure time arising from lack of supervision for a child that
can impact on her well-being
I estimate the effect of a good mark on well-being and I find that it decreases the
probability of a police contact/visit by 4 percentage points. This suggests that:
• a good mark or positive achievement label fosters well-being
• policy makers put under scrutiny the relative contribution of education to teach-
ing core subjects, e.g. maths, as well as to the well-being of children
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Next steps
Sartarelli (2009) looks at the long term effect on the behaviour of adults of:
• secondary school exit exam results
• manipulation of achievement at school
Miranda and Sartarelli (2009) test predictions on motivation and achievement by
modelling with a principal-agent framework the:
• discretionary assignment by teachers of students to different tiers at the same
Key Stage test
• monitoring activity by the Office for Standards in Education, the ”watchdog”
of schools and local services in the UK
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